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In
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Vs.
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PAYNE AND DAY, INC.,
A Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant

R~spond~nt' s Bn~f
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is the second appeal for this case. John S.
Davis, d.b.a. Geneva Lumber Company Vs. Payne and
Day, Inc., a corporation, 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P2d 337.
Respondent took the first appeal from an order of dismissal granted by the court at the end of respondent's
case. This court stated that the evidence, if believed by
the trier of the facts, showed that the respondent here
was entitled to relief, and remanded the case for a new
trial.
Upon the second trial, made to the court sitting
without a jury, the Hon. Will L. Hoyt granted plaintiff
judgment based upon detailed findings of fact. Defendant below prosecuted this appeal from that judgment and an order denying a new trial.
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Because we believe that at this stage of the proceedings there remains only fact questions, we quote
the Findings of Fact, citing the record relied upon for
each finding. It is remembered that the plaintiff below
is the respondent.
"1. That at all times involved herein, the plaintiff,
John S. Davis, was doing business under the name and
style of Geneva Lumber Company; the defendant, Payne
and Day, Inc., was at all times involved herein a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Utah.
( Tr. 15, 21, 461. )

"2. That, during the year 1957, the defendant corporation caused to be constructed sixty-one homes in the
Orem and Provo areas, for sale to prospective purchasers.
(Tr. 250, 368, 463, 533).
"3. That C. E. Slavens was employed by the defendant as a general construction superintendent, to
oversee and supervise the construction of the homes;
that he was so employed under written contracts which
are in evidence herein and which, among other things,
provide that he should share in the profits arising from
savings effected through construction of the houses at
less than the estimated costs; that Mr. Slavens acted
as construction superintendent throughout the construction period and the houses w~re built under his direction
by various contractors. (Tr. 252-6, 368, 513-14; Exh. 20,
21, 22.)
"4. That between February 21, 1957, and September 23, 1957, plaintiff and defendant entered into
and executed a series of six written contracts, substantially similar in form, and identified as plaintiff's exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, in which the plaintiff agreed
to furnish to the defendant corporation certain specified
materials in specified quantities to be used in the construction of the sixty-one homes and the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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agreed to pay stipulated prices for such materials. (Tr.
11 ff, 16; Exh's. 6 to 11 inclusive).
"5. That C. E. Slavens, construction superintendent of defendant, prepared these contracts and the material lists attached thereto as part thereof, and negotiated with the plaintiff for bids upon such materials
and procured the signing of the contracts by the plaintiff
and by the corporate officers of the defendant; that all
transactions between plaintiff and defendant concerning the furnishing of material for the sixty-one homes
herein involved were conducted on behalf of defendant
by its construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens. ( Tr.
16, 164, 252-6, 258-264, 274-9, 392-3, 497-500, 511,
534).
"6. That there was attached to each contract,
plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, a detailed list of
the materials to be furnished, with quantities indicated;
that in each case these were set forth in two groups referred to as "Package 1" and "Package 2", respectively;
that the "Package 1" list covered items known as framing materials, and "Package 2" lists covered finishing
materials. (Tr. 6 ff; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive).
"7. That each of the contracts contained provisions
substantially identical, as follows:
" 'It is mutually agreed that any additions or
deletions in the materials to be furnished are to
be given in writing by the Party of the Second
Part (defendant) to Party of the First Part
(plaintiff) , and the value of the change, based
upon prices quoted in the attached lists, shall
either be added or subtracted from the original
contract.

****

" 'It is understood that delivery vvill be made
and billed by package number as per attached
lists.'
( Exh's. 6-11 inclusive).
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"8. That the plaintiff furnished to the defendant
the materials specified in the material lists attached to
the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, and
from time to time billed the defendant for such materials, each such billing being identified by package number as provided in the contracts; that plaintiff received
payment for the materials in the stated quantities as
specified in the materials lists, parts of the contracts, and
makes no claim herein for any part of such specified
materials. (Tr. 415, 435).
"9. That in addition to the materials as specified
in the material lists, parts of plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11,
inclusive, plaintiff delivered to the projects for use in
construction of the homes other materials not mentioned
in the respective material lists, referred to in this case
for convenience as "extras," of the nature and in the
quantities as specified in plaintiff's exhibit 4, and plaintiff also delivered to the projects for use in construction
of the homes materials of the kind mentioned in the
respective materials lists, but in excess of the quantities
therein listed, referred to in this case for convenience as
"overages" in the quantities specified in plaintiff's exhibit 5. (Tr. 27, 85-8, 93-7, 186-7, 332, 401, 417, 605-6;
Exh's 4, 5, 17).
"10. That the defendant gave no written orders
for delivery of any "extras" or "overages" to any of the
construction projects. (Tr. 85, 88, 163).
"11. That the materials thus delivered were furnished by plaintiff on the oral direction and instructions
of C. E. Slavens, defendant's construction superintendent,
and such materials were used in the course of construction of the sixty-one houses. (Tr. 29-32, 85-88, 160, 181,
232, 320).
"12. That no record was kept by defendant of
materials delivered to the job sites, and that no receipts
for deliveries were signed by anyone on behalf of deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fcndant. (Tr. 64-67, 175-176, 214, 266, 270, 303-4, 3079' 32 7' 3 73-4' 50 1 ) .
"13. --rhat plaintiff kept itemized book records and
an invoice file showing "extras" and "overages" delivered
to the respective job sites, plaintiff's exhibits 1, 2, 3, and
17, and that deliveries were in fact made as shown by
these records. (Tr. 33-37; Exh's. 1, 2, 3, 17).
"14. That at the times when plaintiff billed defendant for materials specified in the materials lists,
parts of the contracts, exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, and
received payment therefor, plaintiff was required to sign
receipts prepared by defendant's construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens, or under his direction; that these
were on printed forms supplied by the First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A., through which bank the defendant was procuring funds for financing construction of
the homes, such receipts being parts of defendant's exhibits 12, 13, 13-B, 14, 14-B, 14-C, 15, 15-A, 15-B, 15C, 16, 16-A, 16-B, 16-C, and 16-D. (Tr. 204-211,
276-8; Exhibits named).
"15. That these receipts and lien waivers were required and payments of the amounts therein specified
were made upon invoices or billings made by plaintiff to
defendant; that said invoices or billings were for materials delivered as per the material lists, parts of the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, without itemization; that these invoices or billings were for the exact
sums specified in such material lists, "Package 1" or
"Package 2" totals, as the case may be; and that payments in each instance also corresponded with the contract price total for rna terial listed in the particular
"packages." (Tr. 204-211; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive; Exh's.
12-16 inclusive).
"16. That at the times of presentation of these bills
and invoices and executions of the receipts and lien
\\·aivers no discussion was had between the parties as
to materials being supplied other than or in addition to
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the rna terials specified in the so-called "packages" or
material lists attached to the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits
6 to 11, inclusive. (Tr. 566).
"17. That duplicate deliveries were made by plaintiff to the first project in Orem, Utah, for the reason
that orders placed were delayed in delivery, necessitating the plaintiff obtain some of the same materials elsewhere; that as result thereof, there was some carry-over
throughout the construction of the projects; that in each
instance, plaintiff inventoried materials thus left over,
and that defendant was in each instance given proper
credit in plaintiff's accounts for all items charged against
one project which were thereafter transferred for use
upon subsequent projects. (Tr. 18-27, 134-35, 140-41,
266, 325, 395).
"18. That there was no understanding or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the
plaintiff was required under the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, to deliver any materials other
than those specifically listed upon the material lists part
of the contracts, in the amounts therein specified. (Tr.
211, 238-9, 566; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive).
"19. That not later than July 1, 1957, defendant
was on notice by reason of written billing that plaintiff
was charging and expecting to be paid for "extras" and
"overages" he delivered to the projects, but defendant,
through its construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens,
continued to authorize and order such "extras" and
"overages" without requiring written order therefor.
(Tr. 60, 404-5, 410-11; Exh. 19).
"20. That plaintiff on January 31, 1958, presented
defendant with his statement for all extra and additional
materials furnished for construction of the sixty-one
houses; and that payment has never been made by or on
behalf of defendant to plaintiff on this statement. (Tr.
413-15, 446; Exh. 30).
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"21. That plaintiff and defendant entered into
other contracts, not in issue herein, for the roofing of
the sixty-one homes herein involved, these contracts containing a similar prohibition against changes without
prior written order of defendant; that under those contracts plaintiff provided roofing materials in addition to
the amounts required by those contracts upon oral order
of the said C. E. Slavens, without written order, and
that defendant paid plaintiff for such additional roofing
materials, "vithout regard to the contract provision requiring prior written order. (Tr. 101-108, 193-4, 197-8,
407-13).
"22. That subsequent to the execution of certain
of the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive,
and without prior notice to plaintiff, defendant changed
plans of some of the houses being constructed, used materials delivered by plaintiff in making such changes,
and plaintiff learned thereof only after the fact, when
additional materials were required of him. (Tr. 99-101,
285-6, 294-6, 301-03, 3 76, 500-1' 516-1 7' 596,
602)
"23. That plaintiff at all times herein involved believed and relied upon the belief that defendant's construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens, had authority
to order extras and additional materials for use in construction of the homes and to do so without signing
orders in writing therefor. (Tr. 160, 211, 421-3, 452).
"24. That neither plaintiff nor his employee, Clyde
Davis, in signing the receipts referred to in finding of
fact no. 14, above, intended such receipts or any of them
to constitute acknowledgment of payment in full for all
material furnished by plaintiff for construction of the
house or houses referred to in the respective receipts, but
on the contrary, intended such receipts to acknowledge
payment for the materials specified in the respective
material lists and referred to collectively as "Package 1,
or Package 2"; that the plaintiff and Clyde Davis did,
0
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however, intend said receipts to operate as waivers of
any lien which plaintiff might claim against the real
estate referred to in the respective receipts. (Tr. 211,
437-446, 455-7).
"25. That neither the defendant nor its construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens, was misled or deceived by the signing of the receipts in the form in which
they were signed, and that the defendant did not suffer
damage by reason of the signing or delivery of such receipts. (Tr. 160, 211, 455-7)."
On the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded
that appellant's construction superintendent had apparent and actual authority to order the extra materials not
on material lists, part of the contracts, and materials on
the lists in greater amounts than therein called for, that
on the facts the requirement of the contracts for written
modification was in effect waived, that the receipts and
lien waivers were not a bar to this action, and that
respondent was entitled to judgment.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED ON THIS APPEAL WERE SETTLED BY THIS COURT ON
THE FIRST APPEAL AND ARE "THE LAW OF
THE CASE."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE FACTS
AGAINST APPELLANT; THE RECORD SUPPORTS THESE FINDINGS; AND UNDER THE
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND.
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.ARGUMENT
POINT I
QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED ON THIS APPEAL \VERE SETTLED BY THIS COURT ON
THE FIRST APPEAL AND ARE "THE LAW OF
THE CASE".
We take the rule to be that where an appellate
court in its opinion states a rule or principle of law
which is directly raised on such appeal, it is necessary
that the appellate court's decision on such rule or principle must be adhered to throughout all the subsequent
proceedings in such case, both in the trial court and upon
a subsequent appeal, unless: (a) A change in the law
has in the meantime been made by legislative action;
or (b) a change in the law has in the meantime been
effected by a decision on precisely the same question by
a higher appellate court. Petty Vs. Clark ( 1948) 113
Utah 205; 912 P2d 589. Of course, the conditions set
forth under (a) and (b) above do not prevail in this
case.
Under Point I of its brief, appellant argues its
theory on the effect of the "Parole Evidence" rule on
certain evidence admitted by the trial court. This point
was argued on the first appeal; it was directly before
this court; and it was resolved by this court in its decision therein. John S. Davis, etc. v. Payne and Day,
Inc., Supra, Headnote 2. We belabor this question no
further.
Under Point II of its brief, appellant argues error
on the question of evidence admitted to show the extent of Mr. Slavens', the construction superintendent's
authority. There is no essential difference between this
evidence offered on the first trial and the evidence offered and admitted on the second trial. This question
was urged before this court on the first appeal; it was
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argued extensively, and the question was decided against
the appellant. We point out that there was never any
question as to whether Slavens was an agent of the corporation. The sole question was the extent of the authority. The trial court in following the decision of this
court on the first appeal admitted the evidence complained of. We submit that the trial court did not
commit error and that the decision on the first appeal
herein laid this issue at rest.
The evidence objected to under Point III of appellant's brief concerning payments made to respondent
under other contracts not in issue herein in connection
with the same construction project, though changes were
not authorized in writing, was offered at the first trial,
objected to by appellant, its admissibility argued before
this court on the first appeal, and considered in this
court's opinion. We deem this point sufficiently answered.
The argument of the appellant under Point IV of
its brief that Slavens did not have the apparent authority claimed by respondent was on the first trial presented before the court at pretrial, and upon the trial.
It was argued before this court on the first appeal, and
the question was decided by this court in that decision.
The trier of the fact on the second trial found that Mr.
Slavens had the actual authority from the corporate
principal to take the action he did regarding extras and
overages. The court further found that he in fact did
make such changes, and we submit that the record
amply supports this finding.
We deem one matter raised by appellant in its brief
should be answered, though we assert that we have
answered it step by step throughout this long and ardous
proceeding. Appellant attempts to point out that there
was some "secret agreement" between respondent and
Mr. Slavens. Appellant completely ignors the fact that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Slavens was the agent of the appellant; that he was
not the agent of the respondent; and that under his
\vritten contract of employment, and under his testimony
at the trial, he was under a duty as agent to the appellant, not to the respondent. We do not know what claim
appellant might be able to successfully assert against
Mr. Slavens, but that issue is not before the court.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE FACTS
AGAINST APPELLANT; THE RECORD SUPPORTS THESE FINDINGS; AND UNDER THE
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND.
This is a law case. We deem it horn book law that
upon a finding of fact made when the evidence is in
dispute, should there be evidence upon which the trier
of the fact could have relied to resolve the dispute, this
court will not upset that finding.
In the statement of facts, we have set forth the
findings of the trier of the fact and referred to extensive
evidence in the record to support these findings.
Of course, there is a dispute of fact. Were there not,
there would be no litigation. The Hon. Will L. Hoyt,
trier of the facts, personally observed the witnesses, and
in fact, participated actively in their interrogation. He
chose which witnesses and what evidence to believe.
Without again reviewing this extensive record, under
this point, we submit that the findings of fact heretofore quoted are amply supported by the record, and
that as a matter fact, the evidence affirmatively refutes
appellant's contention as to what the facts were.
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CONCLUSION
There is no difference between the evidence presented at the first trial and that on the second trial. The
law of this case was decided on the first appeal. The
trier of the fact on the second trial found against appellant, and there is substantial evidence to support this
finding. We respectfully submit that there is no basis
for disturbing the findings and judgment of the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN· B. SORENSEN for
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent
227 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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